Su¢ cient-component causes are incorporated into the directed acyclic graph (DAG) causal framework in order to make apparent several properties of conditioning on a common e¤ect. By incorporating su¢ cient causes on a graph, it is possible to detect conditional independencies within strata of the conditioning variable which are not evident on DAGs without the representation of su¢ cient causes. It is also possible to determine the sign of the conditional covariance of two causes when conditioning on their common e¤ect if some knowledge of the su¢ cient cause mechanisms for the common e¤ect is available. The incorporation of su¢ cient causes within the DAG framework also allows for the representation of interactions on DAGs and for the uni…cation of several di¤erent causal frameworks. For illustration, the results are applied to an example concerning the familial coaggregation of two disorders.
Introduction
Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have been used in epidemiology to represent causal relations among variables and they have been used extensively to determine which variables it is necessary to condition on in order to control for confounding (1) (2) (3) (4) . In some cases, conditioning on a common e¤ect can introduce bias even when none was present without conditioning (2) . Within the DAG framework this is referred to as collider strati…cation bias. Greenland (5) argues that in many cases, collider strati…cation will induce quantitatively less bias than will traditional confounding. Beyond this, relatively little is understood about the consequences of conditioning on a common e¤ect. In this paper, we demonstrate how Rothman's su¢ cient-component cause (SCC) model (6) can be represented on a causal DAG and how doing so elucidates the properties of conditioning on a common e¤ect. We …rst review the SCC and DAG frameworks. We then provide a motivating example concerning familial coaggregation. Theory is then developed concerning the incorporation of su¢ cient causes on DAGs and on conditional independence and conditional covariance properties of conditioning on a common e¤ect. Several previous papers have focused on how the SCC framework is related to the potential outcomes causal framework (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . Here our focus will be the relation between the SCC framework and the DAG framework. We furthermore discuss how the theory developed helps unify these various causal frameworks. We …nally return to the motivating example and show how the methods developed in this paper can be applied and then conclude with some additional discussion.
Su¢ cient-Component Causes
Rothman's SCC framework conceptualized causation as a series of di¤erent causal mechanisms each su¢ cient to bring about the outcome. These causal mechanisms Rothman called "su¢ cient causes" and conceived of them as minimal sets of actions, events or states of nature which together initiated a set of events resulting in the outcome. For a particular outcome there would likely be many di¤erent su¢ cient causes i.e. many di¤erent causal mechanisms by which the outcome could come about. Each su¢ cient cause involved various component causes. Whenever all components of a particular su¢ cient cause were present, the outcome would inevitably occur; within every su¢ cient cause, each component would be necessary for that su¢ cient cause to lead to the outcome.
We will use the following notation. An event is a binary variable taking values in f0; 1g. The OR operator, W , is de…ned for two events A and B such that A W B = 1 if and only if either A = 1 or B = 1. The complement of an event A will be denoted by A. A conjunction or product of the events X 1 ; :::; X n will be written as X 1 :::X n so that X 1 :::X n = 1 if and only if each of the the events X 1 ; :::; X n takes the value 1. Under the SCC framework (6), a series of events or conditions or causes, F 1 ; :::; F m , all of which are binary is said to be a su¢ cient cause for D if F 1 :::F m = 1 implies that D = 1 and if F 1 ; :::; F m is restricted to the minimum number of required components. If S 1 ; :::; S n are all the su¢ cient causes for D where each S i is made up of some product of components which are binary S i = F ::: W S n then we will say that S 1 ; :::; S n are determinative for D.
Directed Acyclic Graphs
A DAG is composed of variables (nodes) and arrows between nodes (directed edges) such that the graph is acyclic i.e. such that it is not possible to start at any node, follow the directed edges in the arrowhead direction and end up back at the same node. A causal DAG is one in which the arrows can be interpreted as causal relationships and in which all common causes of any pair of variables on the graph are also included on the graph. If there is a directed edge from A to Y then A is said to be a parent of Y and Y is said to be a child of A. Additional details concerning causal DAGs can be found in the work of Greenland et al. (2) . Greater formalization is provided in Pearl's work (1, 13) in which DAGs are considered as a graphical representation of structural equations such that each variable is de…ned as a function of its parents and a random error term.
Statistical associations on causal directed acyclic graphs can arise in a number of ways. Two variables, A and B, may be statistically associated if A is a cause of B or if B is a cause of A. Even if neither is the cause of the other, the variables A and B may still be statistically associated if they have some common cause C. Finally, the variables A and B may be statistically associated if they have a common e¤ect K and the association is computed within strata of K. We will graphically represent conditioning by placing a box around the variable on the graph upon which we are conditioning.
More formally, the statistical association between variables can be determined by blocked and unblocked paths. A path is a sequence of nodes connected by edges regardless of arrowhead direction; a directed path is a path which follows the edges in the direction indicated by the graph's arrows. A collider is a particular node on a particular path such that both the preceding and subsequent nodes on the path have directed edges going into that node i.e. both the edge to and the edge from that node have arrowheads into the node. Note that a collider is relative to a particular path: a node that is a collider on one path and may not be a collider on another path. A path between A and B is said to be blocked given (i.e. conditioning on) some set of variables Z if either there is a variable in Z on the path that is not a collider or if there is a collider on the path such that neither the collider itself nor any of its descendants are in Z. If all paths between A and B are blocked given Z then A and B are said to be d-separated given Z. It has been shown that if A and B are d-separated given Z then A and B are conditionally independent given Z (14-16).
Motivating Example
Consider a study in which each observation consists of two individuals within the same family for whom data are available regarding two diseases: bi-polar disorder, denoted by P , and binge-eating, denoted by B. Suppose further that the two diseases are such that P could cause B but B could not cause P . For example, it is possible that bi-polar disorder may lead to binge-eating but rather implausible that binge-eating would lead to bi-polar disorder. The presence of bi-polar disorder in individuals 1 and 2 is denoted by P 1 and P 2 respectively. Similarly the presence of binge-eating in individuals 1 and 2 is denoted by B 1 and B 2 respectively. Let E i denote a certain factor particular to individual i. Let G P denote some factor common to the family which is a cause of bi-polar but not of binge-eating. Let G B denote some factor common to the family which is a cause of binge-eating but not of bi-polar. And let F denote some set of factors common to the family which are causes of both bi-polar and binge-eating. These causal relationships are summarized in the causal DAG given in Figure 1 . The presence of factors F is said to constitute familial coaggregation (17, 18) . Further detail concerning this speci…c example is given elsewhere (James Hudson et al., Harvard University, unpublished manuscript). Suppose that data is available only on P 1 ; P 2 ; B 1 ; B 2 and we wish to test the null hypothesis of no familial coaggregation (i.e. the null hypothesis that there are no directed edges emanating from F ). Suppose further that E 1 and E 2 are never preventive for P 1 and B 1 or for P 2 and B 2 respectively and that G P is never preventive for P 1 or P 2 and that G B is never preventive for B 1 or B 2 . At the end of the paper we will show how tests for the null hypothesis of no familial coaggregation can be derived from the theory developed in this paper.
Su¢ cient Causation Structures on Directed Acyclic Graphs
If some node D is such that D and all its parents are binary and the su¢ cient causes for D are known then it is possible to construct a new causal DAG with the su¢ cient causes for D on the DAG. Consider the causal DAG given in Figure 2 . Suppose that the node D and all of its parents, E 1 ; :::; E 5 are binary. Suppose further that E 1 E 2 and E 2 E 3 E 4 and E 4 E 5 are a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D. Then it can be shown (see Result 1 below) that the diagram given in Figure 3 with all of the su¢ cient causes for D as new nodes is also a causal DAG. To indicate that the set of su¢ cient causes is determinative we will add to the diagram an ellipse around the su¢ cient cause nodes. Fig. 3 . Causal DAG with a su¢ cient causation structure.
The example that we have given is legitimized by and is a special case of the resulted presented below. The proof of this result can be found elsewhere (19) .
Result 1. Consider a causal DAG G with some node D such that D and all its parents are binary. If a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D, say S 1 ; :::; S n , can be constructed from the parents of D and their complements then a new causal DAG J can be formed by adding to G the nodes S 1 ; :::; S n , removing the directed edges into D from the parents of D on G, adding directed edges from each S i into D and adding directed edges into each S i from every parent of D on G which appears in the conjunction for S i .
When we construct these new causal DAGs with the su¢ cient causes we will in general replace the su¢ cient causes nodes S i with the conjunctions that constitute them. We will call the resulting diagram a causal DAG with a su¢ cient causation structure. We will say that the node D admits a su¢ cient causation structure. One criticism of the causal DAG framework is that it does not allow for the representation of interactions amongst variables (9) . However, causal DAGs with su¢ cient causation structures overcome this criticism by allowing for the graphical representation of interactions on a DAG. For example, in Figure 3 , E 1 and E 2 interact synergistically in their e¤ects on D since they are both present in a single su¢ cient cause where E 2 and E 3 interact antagonistically in their e¤ects on D since E 2 and E 3 are both present in a single su¢ cient cause. Thus, in the case of binary variables, causal DAGs with su¢ cient causation structures overcome a major shortcoming in the traditional DAG causal framework.
If it is not possible to form a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D from the parents of D and their complements, it may be possible to add nodes to the DAG so that on the larger causal DAG a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D can be constructed from the parents of D and their complements. We will use the terms background causes or co-causes to refer to the additional parents of D, say A 0 ; :::; A u , which are added to the graph so as to be able to construct a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D from the parents of D and their complements. Unless it is known that A 0 ; :::; A u have no common causes then a variable U with directed edges into each of A 0 ; :::; A u must also be added to the graph. It can be shown that it is always possible to …nd such additional nodes A 0 ; :::; A u . In the Appendix it is shown that it is always possible to …nd such additional nodes for two binary causes. The proof of the more general result can be found elsewhere (19) .
The result given above provides a link between all four of the causal model frameworks discussed by Greenland and Brumback (9): graphical models, potential outcome (counterfactual) models, SCC models and structural equation models. The four are linked through structural equations. Graphical models can be interpreted as diagrammatic shorthand for structural equations (1) . Structural equations can be interpreted as sets of counterfactual relations (1, 7). The result presented above provides the …nal link by relating SCC models to graphical models and thereby also structural equation models. In fact the structural equation for each su¢ cient cause node S i is given by the product of components that constitute the su¢ cient cause S i = F The construction of determinative sets of su¢ cient conjunctions for D will generally not be unique. For example, if D = A 0 W A 1 E then it is also the case that D = B 0 W B 1 E where B 0 = A 0 and B 1 = A 0 A 1 . This non-uniqueness of the su¢ cient causes for D is discussed further in the following section. If the parents of D on the original DAG are labeled E 1 ; :::; E m then each su¢ cient cause S i must either include the variable E i in its conjunction or include E i in its conjunction or include neither E i nor E i in its conjunction; clearly it cannot include both. There are thus 3 m possible combinations of the E i 's and their complements that may appear in su¢ cient causes.
Conditional Independence when Conditioning on a Common E¤ect
Because a causal DAG with a su¢ cient causation structure is itself a causal DAG, the d-separation criterion apply and allow one to determine independencies and conditional independencies. A suf…cient causation structure will often make apparent conditional independencies within strata of the conditioning variable which were not apparent on the original causal DAG. This is so because if some node D on a causal DAG admits a su¢ cient causation structure then conditioning on D = 0 also conditions on all su¢ cient cause nodes for D on the causal DAG with the su¢ cient causation structure. For example, consider a causal DAG with the su¢ cient causation structure given in Figure  4 . Fig. 4 . A su¢ cient causation structure with conditional independencies within the D=0 stratum.
Conditioning on D = 0 also conditions on E 1 E 2 = 0 and E 3 E 4 = 0 and thus we have by the dseparation criterion that, for example, E 1 is conditionally independent of E 4 given D = 0 because any path from E 1 to E 4 passes through E 1 E 2 , which is in the conditioning set, and therefore all paths between E 1 and E 4 are blocked given D = 0. If the causal DAG did not have the su¢ cient causation structure so that the causal relationships were thus simply those given in Figure 5 then the conditional independence of E 1 and E 4 given D = 0 would no longer be apparent from the causal DAG because the path from E 1 to E 4 through D is no longer blocked given D = 0 since we are conditioning on the collider D. Our results provide the theoretical framework for and the generalization of the conditional independence example of Hernán et al. (20) . To ensure that the DAG with the su¢ cient causation structure is itself a causal DAG, it is important that the set of su¢ cient causes for D on the graph is a determinative set of su¢ cient causes, i.e. that the su¢ cient causes represent all the pathways by which the outcome D may occur. Otherwise certain nodes may have common causes which are not on the graph; and the graph will then not be a causal DAG. In this example, a surgical procedure E a¤ects survival through the removal of a tumor; haplotype U a¤ects survival through increasing levels of low-density lipoprotein-cholesterol levels resulting in an increased risk of heart attack (whether or not a tumor is present). There are two cause-speci…c mortality variables: death from a tumor D 1A and death from heart attack D 1B either of which is su¢ cient for death D. Hernán et al. (20) claim that if death by tumor and death by heart attack are independent in the sense that they do not share a common cause and if surgery E is independent of haplotype U then E and U will be conditionally independent given D = 0 (i.e. amongst the survivors). They make this claim on the basis of the DAG given in Figure 6 . Here A 0 represents the causes of death other than tumor and heart attack; A 1 represents the causes of death by tumor other than surgery E; A 2 represents the causes of heart attack other than haplotype U . In Figure 6 , D 1A and D 1B are marginally independent and have no common causes, the background causes A 1 and A 2 are marginally independent and E and U are marginally independent. However, the background causes A 0 and A 1 have common cause C 1 and the background causes A 0 and A 2 have common cause C 2 . Conditioning on D = 0 also conditions on A 0 = 0, A 1 E = 0 and A 2 U = 0 but, conditioning on D = 0, there is still an unblocked path from E to U , namely
The example thus illustrates a case not considered in the conditional independence example of Hernán et al. (20) and further demonstrates the importance of ensuring that the set of su¢ cient causes for D displayed on the graph is a determinative set of su¢ cient causes so that the resulting diagram is in fact a causal DAG i.e. so that all common causes of any two variables on the graph are also on the graph. If the su¢ cient causes which are added to the DAG are not a determinative set, then the resulting diagram may not in fact be a causal DAG.
It was noted above that the set of determinative su¢ cient causes for D will not generally be unique. Consider the causal DAG with the su¢ cient causation structure indicated in Figure 8 . Suppose that A, B and C represent three toxic exposures such that A and B jointly or C alone are su¢ cient for the outcome D, death. Conditioning on D = 0 conditions also on AB = 0 and C = 0 and by the d-separation criterion, A is conditionally independent of C given D = 0. Suppose that the causal mechanisms are as follows: the presence of A and B jointly always causes heart failure resulting in death; in the absence of B, the toxic exposure C always causes respiratory failure resulting in death; but in the presence of B, C causes a failure of the nervous system again resulting in death.
We then have three distinct causal mechanisms for death: AB, BC, and BC. This implies that we can represent these causal mechanisms by the causal DAG with su¢ cient causation structure given in Figure 9 . Both Figures 8 and 9 are causal DAGs that correctly describe the causal relationships among the variables; they di¤er in the level of detail present. In Figure 9 , conditioning on D = 0 conditions also on AB = 0, BC = 0 and BC = 0 but the d-separation criterion no longer imply that A and C are conditionally independent given D = 0 because on the causal DAG, there are two unblocked paths between A and C conditioning on D = 0, namely A AB B BC C and A AB B BC C. Thus from the causal DAG given in Figure 8 it was possible to use the d-separation criterion to identify the conditional independence of A and C given D = 0. But from the causal DAG given in Figure 9 the d-separation criterion would not identify this conditional independence relation even though the two DAGs describe the same causal structure and even though the conditional independence relation truly does hold. The di¢ culty arises because on the graph in Figure 9 we are representing su¢ cient causes which are not minimally su¢ cient. The mechanisms BC and BC are distinct, death due to a failure of the nervous system versus death due to respiratory failure, but in neither mechanism is B or B necessary; C itself is always su¢ cient for death regardless of whether the toxic exposure B is absent or present. We see then that allowing su¢ cient causes on a causal DAG which are not minimally su¢ cient can sometimes obscure conditional independence relations. It may thus be desirable to use the causal DAGs given in both Figures 8 and 9 : the …rst to make clear the conditional independence relations and the second to represent the distinct causal mechanisms which interestingly need not be minimally su¢ cient.
Conditional Covariance When Conditioning on a Common E¤ect
If some knowledge of the su¢ cient causes for an outcome D is available, it will sometimes be possible to determine the sign of the conditional covariance of two causes when conditioning on a common e¤ect. We must …rst however introduce the concept of a monotonic e¤ ect. Consider an outcome D with two causes of interest, E 1 and E 2 . We will say that E 1 has a positive monotonic e¤ ect on D if intervening to increase E 1 will never decrease D for any individual regardless of the level to which E 2 is set; we can de…ne a monotonic e¤ect for E 2 on D similarly; negative monotonic e¤ ects are also de…ned analogously. The de…nition of a monotonic e¤ect thus essentially requires that the e¤ect of some intervention be in a particular direction for every individual in the population, not merely on average. The requirements for the attribution of a monotonic e¤ect are thus considerable. However whenever a particular intervention is always bene…cial or neutral for all individuals, one will be able to attribute a positive monotonic e¤ect; whenever the intervention is always harmful or neutral for all individuals, one will be able to attribute a negative monotonic e¤ect.
We now consider the relation of a monotonic e¤ect to the su¢ cient causes of D. When D and all its parents are binary the presence of a monotonic e¤ect of E on D implies that there exists a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D such that E never appears in the conjunctions for any of the su¢ cient causes (19) . Thus if two parents of D, say E 1 and E 2 , both have monotonic e¤ects on D then there exists a determinative set of su¢ cient causes for D such that the su¢ cient causes for D may have amongst their components E 1 or E 2 or E 1 E 2 or neither E 1 nor E 2 but never E 1 or E 2 or E 1 E 2 . If E 1 and E 2 are independent of one another and have positive monotonic e¤ects on D then the minimal su¢ cient causation structure for the causal DAG can be described by the graph given in Figure 10 . With this de…nition of a monotonic e¤ect we can now give Result 2.
Result 2. Suppose that D and all of its parents are binary and suppose that two parents of D, say E 1 and E 2 , are independent and also independent of all other parents of D on the causal DAG. Suppose further that E 1 and E 2 have a positive monotonic e¤ect on D. Then for any determinative set of su¢ cient causes D such that
If A 3 = 0 and if A 1 and A 2 are independent and also A 0 is independent of either A 1 or A 2 then Cov(E 1 ; E 2 jD) = 0.
The assumption that
If any of these assumptions can be made then we can draw conclusions about the conditional covariance between E 1 and E 2 . Result 2 can be generalized if E 1 and E 2 are not independent. The statement and proof of this generalization is given in the supplementary material on-line. The result can also be generalized when the conditional covariance of two nodes which are not parents of D are considered (19) . We give an example of one such generalization, Result 3, in the Appendix.
Motivating Example Revisited
We now return to the motivating example introduced at the beginning of the paper and show how Results 2 and 3 can be used to derive a statistical test for the presence of no familial coaggregation. We will graphically represent the monotonic e¤ects relationships indicated earlier by signs on the appropriate edges. The null hypothesis of no familial coaggregation can then be represented by the signed causal DAG given in Figure 11 with no arrows out of F . Under the null hypothesis of no familial coaggregation, by Result 2, Cov(E 1 ; G P jP 1 = 1) 0 if E 1 and G P do not exhibit synergism. By Result 3 (see Appendix) we have sign(Cov(B 1 ; P 2 jP 1 = 1)) = sign(Cov(E 1 ; G P jP 1 = 1)). Thus under the null hypothesis of no familial coaggregation, sign(Cov(B 1 ; P 2 jP 1 = 1)) = sign(Cov(E 1 ; G P jP 1 = 1)) 0 if there is no synergism between E 1 and G P in the SCC sense. Consequently, a test of the null Cov(B 1 ; P 2 jP 1 = 1) 0 is a joint test of no familial coaggregation and of no synergism between E 1 and G P . Similarly, a test of the null Cov(B 2 ; P 1 jP 2 = 1) 0 is a joint test of no familial coaggregation and of no synergism between E 2 and G P .
Discussion
The primary contributions of this paper have been a number of theoretical advances in representing and reasoning about causal relations. Speci…cally we have provided a link between and have helped unify several di¤erent causal models: SCC, counterfactual, graphical and structural equation models. Doing so, allowed us to derive a number of properties of conditioning on a common e¤ect. We have shown that representing su¢ cient causes on a DAG can allow for the detection of conditional independence relations within strata of the conditioning variable that are not evident on traditional causal DAGs. We have also stated conditions which allow a researcher to draw conclusions about the sign of the conditional covariance of two causes when conditioning on a common e¤ect. Finally, we have shown how su¢ cient causes and synergistic interactions can be graphically represented on causal DAGs.
For the theory presented in this paper to be applied to epidemiologic problems, relatively strong assumptions are needed: binary outcomes and exposures, the conditional independence assumptions of DAGs, knowledge of or conjectures about determinative sets of su¢ cient causes, and monotonic e¤ects. These assumptions limit the applicability of the theory. We will discuss each of these assumptions in turn. Although the theory is limited to binary outcomes and exposures many outcomes and exposures of interest in epidemiologic research are binary. Furthermore, for ordinal or categorical exposures the theory developed can be applied by recoding the exposure as a series of binary variables; the outcome however would still need to be binary in order for Results 2 and 3 to be applied. Our results made use of the various conditional independence assumptions entailed by DAGs. Many medical and epidemiologic systems can be usefully represented by DAGs as testi…ed to by the increasing occurrence of DAGs in the epidemiologic literature. The structure of the DAG itself implies the conditional independence assumptions which we made use of in our results. The requirement that the researcher have knowledge of or conjectures about a determinative set of su¢ cient causes can be somewhat relaxed, but the details are somewhat beyond the scope of the current paper (19) . Monotonic e¤ects assume that a particular exposures a¤ects all individuals in the same direction; although this is a strong assumption, it is one that may apply to a number of epidemiologic exposures e.g. the e¤ect of smoking on lung cancer or perhaps the e¤ect of certain genes or environmental exposures. Furthermore, the assumption of monotonic e¤ects can sometimes be weakened to assumptions about the ordering of intervention distributions as discussed in other work (21) . Although the assumptions required to apply the theory in this paper are considerable, they are not insurmountable, as our example from psychiatric epidemiology demonstrates. Moreover our results perform an important cautionary function: they de…ne the number, type and strength of the assumptions that are required in order to succeed in using epidemiologic data to draw conclusions from su¢ cient causes on causal DAGs.
The DAG framework has proved to be a useful tool for causal thinking in epidemiologic research. Several recent papers have extended the applicability of DAGs to new types of problems (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) . The contributions in this paper concerning su¢ cient causes and the properties of conditioning on a common e¤ect extend yet further the scope of the types of problems which DAGs can address.
We will show that it is possible to construct co-causes which can be added to the DAG so that a determinative set of su¢ cient causes can be formed from E 1 ; E 2 ; E 1 ; E 2 and the co-causes. The construction we give will work even if E 1 and E 2 have common causes. We construct A 0 ; :::; A 8 so that The causal DAG with this su¢ cient causation structure is then that given in Figure 13 . Fig. 13 . Su¢ cient causation structure for D with two binary causes, E 1 and E 2 .
Result 3.
Suppose that E 1 , E 2 and D are binary variables, that E 1 and E 2 are the only parents of D, that F and G are d-separated given fE 1 ; E 2 ; Dg, that F and E 2 are d-separated given fE 1 ; Dg and that G and E 1 are d-separated given fE 2 ; Dg. Suppose also that E 1 is a parent of F , that E 1 has a monotonic e¤ect on F , that there are no intermediate variables between E 1 and F , and E 1 and F have no common causes; and suppose that E 2 is a parent of G, that E 2 has a monotonic e¤ect on G, that there are no intermediate variables between E 2 and G, and that E 2 and G have no common causes then sign(Cov(F; GjD)) = sign(Cov(E 1 ; E 2 jD)).
